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 Abstract2: Over the past decade the European Union concluded dozens of free 
trade agreements. These agreements are aimed at more than removing barriers to trade 
in goods; in a much broader context they also regulate other trade-related issues. Their 
purpose is to enhance the competitiveness of the Europe Union and to provide markets 
and investment opportunities for European companies. The EU offers so-called Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTA) to neighbourhood regions, including 
the Southern Mediterranean area. The agreements would help the countries concerned 
to transform their legal system along European patterns so that they would essentially 
be integrated into the single market and become competitive growing economies. The EU 
would benefit from the resulting decrease in security risk from the concerned countries. 
Although in an optimal case DCFTAs indeed have a positive effect on the integration of 
Southern Mediterranean countries into the global economy, for the time being the risks 
seem to be greater than the benefits. 
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 Introduction
 From the very beginning, trade policy has played a crucial role in the 
European integration. The European Economic Community created a customs union 
among the member states, which called for the unification of national trade policies 
with third countries. Getting into the single European market – a market constantly 
growing in importance – was a strong attraction for every country, and the European 
Union strove to provide its producers the best possible access to markets outside its 
borders. Consequently, trade policy has become one of the most crucial components of 
promoting EU’s external interests. 
 The European Union (both the member states and the union) has been involved 
in multilateral trade negotiations from the outset, yet a wide array of special bilateral 
trade agreements have been applied in its external relations (Gstöhl – de Bièvre 2018: 
177). They include closer bilateral association and free trade agreements signed with 
neighbouring countries, as well as sets of agreements providing preferential trade 
1 Tamás Szigetvári, PhD. Associate professor, Pázmány Péter Catholic University, senior research fellow; Institute for 
World Economics, Centre of Economic and Regional Studies. E-mail: tamas.szigetvari@gmail.com
2 This research was supported by the János Bolyai Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
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options to former colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific region. Since the 
2000s, when it became increasingly clear that trade liberalisation in the context of the 
WTO had come to a deadlock, the EU has gradually put a greater emphasis on bilateral 
free trade agreements as the way forward towards trade liberalisation. This form of 
bilateralism and regionalism gaining popularity is nothing new for the EU. However, 
these agreements have recently become central components of the EU’s global presence. 
Not only do they serve for trading purposes but in a wider sense they are vehicles for 
the promotion of the EU’s interests and values (Griller et al., 2017: 14).
 For a long time, the EU’s FTAs only pertained to industrial products 
and bypassed agricultural goods which enjoyed strong protectionism. However, 
fundamental changes started in the late 1990s also in this respect. As more and more 
areas related to trade were involved in international regulation within the WTO, so did 
FTAs, going beyond simple tariff elimination. Concluding comprehensive agreements 
with the EU’s neighbouring countries has been on the agenda. As the agreements also 
involve significant (predominantly unilateral) regulatory approximation, they are 
termed ‘deep’ in addition to comprehensive. 
 In what follows, first we provide an overview of the system and functioning 
of the free trade agreements of the EU: how the number of countries that signed 
FTAs with the EU have been increased, and why and in what extent the scope of these 
agreements has been deepened. The next parts discusses the EU’s relation with the 
Southern Mediterranean countries with a special focus on trade relations and on the 
impact of FTAs concluded in the late 1990s with the countries of the region. Finally, we 
will examine the opportunities the new DCFTA-type agreements offered to countries 
of the Southern Mediterranean region, and also the risks involved.
 
 First generation free trade agreements
 Many of the EU’s so-called first generation preferential trade agreements 
were concluded before the turn of the millennium. They differ from the more recent 
agreements in both goals and content. FTAs are a form of bilateral or regional trade 
pacts regulating the tariffs and duties that countries impose on imports and exports in 
order to dismantle trade barriers. Unlike customs unions, which determine identical 
external tariffs with regard to trade with non-parties, an FTA only eliminates tariffs and 
duties in respect of trade between the signatories.
 The first FTAs included those signed with the EFTA countries (Norway 
and Switzerland) in the 1970s, FTAs signed in the context of Euro-Mediterranean 
Association Agreements in the 1990s, and also the agreements signed with Mexico 
(2000) and Chile (2003), and with the Western Balkan countries (2001 and 2016). The 
customs union with Turkey (1995) is an agreement similar in terms of free movement 
of goods but is very different in several important respects. 
 The free trade agreements with the EEC and the EFTA states were signed in 
1977, after the accession of the United Kingdom and Denmark. It eliminated tariffs 
on industrial goods in trade. After the creation of the European Union in 1992, the 
European Economic Area was established, creating a free trade zone for the EU 
member states and non-EU member EFTA states (currently Norway, Iceland and 
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Liechtenstein) that enabled free movement of goods, services, labour and capital. 
According to the EEA Agreement, in order to have free access to the EU’s single market 
non-EU states must unilaterally adopt and implement most EU legislation concerning 
the single market, and pay a financial contribution to strengthen social and economic 
cohesion. The EEA Agreement does not cover agriculture and fisheries. Although some 
agricultural products are subject to preferential trade arrangements and food hygiene 
legislations have been harmonised, these areas still fall outside the scope of the EEA3. 
 The Euro-Mediterranean agreements of the 1990s replaced the unilateral 
preferential trade agreements concluded with the Southern Mediterranean countries in 
the 1970s. The FTAs signed as part of the association agreements also covered industrial 
goods and often extended unilateral preferences to Mediterranean states4.
 Countries of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) region have been 
the oldest preferential areas in the EU’s trade policy. Under the Yaoundé and the 
Lomé Conventions the EEC extended unilateral preferences to ACP countries by 
asymmetrically eliminating tariffs on industrial goods. In 2000 the Cotonou Agreement 
created a new approach to cooperation, which meant the beginning of the economic 
partnership agreements (EPAs).
 While the EPAs signed with the ACP countries are free trade agreements, they 
are essentially focused on development, containing numerous asymmetries to enable 
ACP countries to protect their markets in a variety of areas. The goal of the agreements 
is to promote the integration of the ACP countries into world economy by fostering 
regional and global trade relations. Although these agreements are also comprehensive, 
covering services and other areas related to trade, this aspect has only been realised 
with the Caribbean countries; its incorporation in the agreements is subject to further 
negotiations with the other countries. Complete liberalisation is envisioned after a 
period of transition of 15 to 25 years, so the full impact of the agreements will manifest 
gradually. Despite the long run-in period, some of the ACP countries are concerned 
about the expected drop in their governments’ income (Murray-Evans 2019)5.
 The EU concluded stabilisation and association agreements (SAAs) with the 
Western Balkans in the context of the Stabilisation and Association Process. The SAAs 
include free trade agreements as well as an extensive set of terms for harmonisation 
and cooperation as each of the Western Balkan countries concerned is aspiring 
at the ultimate goal of full EU membership. Accession negotiations are in progress 
with Montenegro and Serbia and are expected to start soon with Albania and North 
Macedonia. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are currently striving to stabilise 
their respective statehood.
 Concluded in 1995, the EU-Turkey Customs Union Agreement differs from 
FTAs in that Turkey unilaterally applies the EU’s tariffs in respect of third countries. 
3 Switzerland has not ratified the EEA Agreement but concluded a bilateral FTA with the EU with a similar content 
including agreements on the free movement of services, labour and capital.
4 These agreements and their impacts will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters of this paper.
5 This may be considerable primarily in the case of West Africa. EPAs are concluded on a regional basis and the 
EU urges the countries of each region to sign similar agreements with each another. The seven regional blocs – five 
African, one Caribbean and one Pacific – comprise 51 countries. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/
BRIE/2018/625102/EPRS_BRI(2018)625102_EN.pdf
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In addition, Turkey aligned its domestic legislation with the acquis communautaire 
in several essential trade-related areas (such as, for instance, the regulation of 
competition). The customs union covers industrial goods; agriculture and services are 
excluded. While the EU-Turkey customs union gave an impetus to the liberalisation of 
the Turkish economy and enhanced its competitiveness, only the hope of ultimate EU 
membership made the costs and curtailing of trade policy sovereignty bearable. With 
the chances of accession on the wane, Turkey is less and less interested in maintaining 
the customs union agreement in its current form (Szigetvári, 2014). Re-negotiation of 
the agreement was on the agenda, mainly with a view to expand its scope, but the EU 
suspended the procedure in the wake of the political processes in Turkey.
 Mexico was the first Latin American country to sign an FTA with the EU. The 
agreement entered into effect in 2000 and covered the free trade of services as well 
as goods. Chile signed an association agreement with the EU in 2002 with a similar 
content. Although they belong to the first generation of free trade agreements, they 
contain some of the components that would appear in subsequent FTAs (e.g. services 
and investment protection).
 New generation of free trade agreements
 Changes in global trade have called for reshaping trade-related regulations. 
At WTO level, international trade liberalisation had been expanded to a number of 
new areas, but multilateral processes slowed down because of new contentions (arising 
primarily between blocs of developed and developing countries). Responding to 
these trends, the EU has moved to a new generation of bilateral FTAs in accordance 
with its ‘Global Strategy’ and privileged the interests of European companies (Siles-
Brügge 2014: 9). The new agreements provided for many other areas besides trading 
in goods, such as services, intellectual property, investments, public procurement, 
the energy sector, raw materials, as well as competition law, public companies, and 
regulatory cooperation. In addition, many of the agreements contain principles to 
foster sustainable development and human rights, and more recently, anti-corruption 
and priority treatment of SMEs. By investment contracts – for the sake of enforceability 
- interstate settlement of disputes has been preferred to the old investor vs. State dispute 
settlement system. Most FTAs signed after 2006 fall in the category of new generation 
agreements. They include the agreements with South Korea, Colombia, Peru, Central 
America and Canada. While the content of the agreements is different, they cover most 
of the important new areas mentioned above. 
 Besides their mercantile focus, the agreements are meant to expand EU 
interests on a global scale. According to the EU’s trade strategy, trade policy is aimed 
at enhancing the EU’s competitiveness and growth, creating jobs and investments, and 
boosting innovation. At the same time, it must be in harmony with the EU’s external 
policy principles and goals (e.g. development policy and neighbourhood policy), as 
well as with the social model and values of the Union (Meissner 2018). Supporting 
development, ensuring employees’ rights, human rights protection, sustainability, 
climate protection, and, as the case may be, the requirement of a democratic political 
system also feature in these agreements. It is conspicuous that the EU uses its strongest 
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‘weapon’, trade policy agreements, to globally enforce the values to which it subscribes. 
Of course the question is to what extent often contradictory economic interests 
and European values can be reconciled through these agreements. Simultaneous 
achievement of these goals is by no means easy and in many respects, impossible.
 The so-called Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) is 
similar to comprehensive free trade agreements but creates deeper relations. DCFTAs 
cover industry, agriculture and services, and also include extensive convergence towards 
EU standards in areas related to trade. Offered to neighbouring countries, DCFTAs 
practically make the countries concerned part of the single European market, as the 
neighbouring state is required to enshrine the EU’s market regulations (regulation of 
competition, standards, trade regulations, etc.) in its own legislation. 
 DCFTAs have been concluded with the three Eastern Partnership states, 
Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. Armenia was also involved in similar negotiations but 
eventually opted for the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union6. In December 2011 the 
Council offered to negotiate DCFTAs with the four Southern Mediterranean countries 
most advanced along to road to strengthening trade relations: Jordan, Egypt, Morocco 
and Tunisia. 
 Although the DCFTA model of relations is relatively new, some impact studies 
have already analysed the benefits and costs of these agreements (e.g. Adarov-Havlik 
2016, Hoekman 2016). On the whole, the impact of DCFTAs is positive but there 
are significant differences between countries (Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine). The 
strongest positive effect is the expansion of exports; conversely, up until now there has 
been not much change in FDI. 
 Trading with these countries has changed noticeably and the EU’s share in trade 
has increased – albeit currently this share is large only in Moldova (approximately 70% 
thanks mainly to Romania and Italy), and still relatively low in Georgia and Ukraine 
(30-35%)7. It is also evident, that political factors (notably, deteriorating relations with 
Russia) are in the background of engagement with the EU, and the actual economic 
rationale is sometimes weaker. At the same time, constraints (i.e. the shrinking Russian 
market) also generated positive incentives to modernise the economic structure and 
strengthen the competitiveness of exports. Structural changes are conspicuous in some 
areas: the beverages (wine) sector in Moldova that contributed 30% to exports in the 
early 2000s slumped below 10% and the share of the machine industry (auto parts) grew 
from less than 1% to over 10% (Adarov – Havlik, 2016). After 2008 Russia’s boycott led 
to falling wine exports also in Georgia after 2008, but by now the sector recaptured its 
earlier share. In Ukraine, where the ramifications of political factors are most keenly felt, 
the transformation gained momentum after 2014. Finding new markets is exacerbated 
by the fact that the bulk of machine and heavy industry is concentrated in East Ukraine 
where Russian markets are still preferred over the EU.  
 In what follows we provide an overview of Euro-Mediterranean trade relations. 
We review their history and attempt to forecast the future impacts of the DCFTAs 
6 With its significant military and economic influence in the country, Russia pressed Armenia to join.
7 Data based on Eurostat trade statistics, from https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/international-trade-in-goods/data/
database
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contemplated by the EU.
 The EU and the Southern Mediterranean region
 The new regionalism gaining ground in Europe from the 1990s forced many 
developing countries to seek free trade agreements with the developing countries that 
were their main trading partners. Many thought these trade integrations could lay the 
foundations for economic growth in the developing countries: better access to export 
markets would stimulate domestic competition, which in turn would drive economic 
modernisation. Moreover, as these economies become increasingly attractive targets for 
investment, the influx of FDI would promote their integration into the global economy. 
This position has been shared by EU policymakers: according to the dominant rhetoric 
free trade facilitates economic development in the region, which is good for the EU’s 
security (Langan 2015). But even the official rhetoric reflects a dual approach nurtured 
by realism and idealism: the EU supports the development of neighbouring regions 
and their integration into the globalised economy (idealism), but the main motivation 
of this effort is ensuring the EU’ own security (realism).
 Created in 1995, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) provides a 
framework for the EU to conclude Association Agreements (AAs) with the Southern 
Mediterranean countries8. The EMP was built upon three pillars: political, economic 
and cultural cooperation. The economic pillar of the association agreements gave rise to 
FTAs with the individual countries rather than the region, so the originally envisioned 
Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area has never actually been created.
 A closer look at the trade relations of the Southern Mediterranean countries 
and the EU over the past period reveals that the high expectations of FTAs’ positive 
impacts have not been fulfilled. (Table 1)
Table 1. EU28 trade with Med119 (2007-2018)
Imports Exports Balance
million euro % of extra-
EU
million euro % of extra-
EU
million euro
2007 134,784 9.3 124,221 10.1 –10,563
2008 151,654 9.6 137,495 10.5 –14,157
2009 107,265 8.7 121,239 11.1 13,974
2010 133,333 8.7 150,714 11.1 17,381
2011 132,237 7.6 161,916 10.4 29,680
2012 155,499 8.6 175,207 10.4 19,707
8 AAs are in force with Tunisia (1998), Morocco (2000), Israel (2000), Jordan (2002), Egypt (2004), Algeria (2005), 
Lebanon (2006) and Palestinian National Authority (1997, interim agreement). The AA with Syria has yet to be signed 
and ratified, and no AA has been concluded with Libya.
9 Eurostat statistics use the aggregate Med11 for Southern Mediterranean countries, including also Turkey
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2013 146,480 8.7 179,427 10.3 32,947
2014 139,396 8.2 177,494 10.4 38,098
2015 133,608 7.7 184,987 10.3 51,378
2016 131,942 7.7 186,244 10.7 54,302
2017 148,318 8.0 194,194 10.3 45,876
2018 163,113 8.2 187,260 9.6 24,147
Source: Eurostat
 The region’s position in bilateral trade has markedly deteriorated: after a 
positive trade balance achieved by the Southern Mediterranean region up to 2008, from 
2009 bilateral trade was characterised by increasing EU dominance, a trend that only 
stopped in the last two years. A reason for the negative trend was the EU’s significantly 
declining import demand, which also hit the Mediterranean EU countries. In addition, 
the Arab Spring and subsequent political events slashed exports in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya 
and Syria. Declining oil prices on the world market also had a detrimental effect on the 
region’s earnings from exports. Nevertheless, while oil exports to the EU fell from 66 
billion to 28 billion euros between 2013 and 2016, total EU exports dropped only by 
15 billion euros, which means export of some other products achieved growth. There 
was a rise in the amount of foodstuffs exported (from 9.1 billion to 11.3 billion euros), 
and in the processing industry (from 70 billion to 88 billion) machine and transport 
industries became pull branches (growing from 28 billion to 40 billion). The main 
driver of the Mediterranean export growth that started after 2016 was skyrocketing 
Libyan oil export10.
Table 2. The trade of Mediterranean countries with the EU28 (2007 and 2018)
Imports from the EU-28
million euro
Exports to the EU-28
million euro
2007 2018 2007 2018
Algeria 11,270 18,911 20,585 20,990
Egypt 10,343 19,210 7,039 8,502
Israel 14,299 20,785 11,343 13,609
Jordania 2,654 3,573 221 300
Lebanon 3,376 7,216 309 513
Libya 4,228 4,521 27,401 16,785
Marocco 12,380 23,250 8,115 16,071
Palestine 46 243 14 18
Syria 3,273 655 3,387 107
10 The value of Libyan oil exports is still well under the 2007 level, see https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/libya/
crude-oil-exports
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Tunisia 9,552 11,634 8,991 10,139
Turkey 52,830 77,262 47,378 76,079
Source: Eurostat
 It is to be noted that the designation EuroMed 11 used in EU statistics includes 
Turkey, a country that stands out within the region in terms of bilateral trade, and 
also Israel, another country with a totally different export structure including mainly 
processing industrial, often high-tech, products. 
 Trading in services generates a positive balance for the Southern Mediterranean 
countries primarily thanks to tourism, but the surplus is way below the deficit in the 
trading of goods and does little to offset the deficit in overall trade with the EU. In 
addition, in recent years the Mediterranean surplus in the trade of services has shrunk 
as tourism has been declining as a result of the political instability in the region.













World 417.2 100.0 World 247.5 100.0 World 664.6 100.0
1. EU-28 173.4 41.6 1. EU-28 120.2 48.6 1. EU-28 293.6 44.2
2. China 60.0 13.2 2. USA 28.4 11.5 2. China 61.4 9.2
3. USA 27.2 6.5 3. UAE 8.1 3.3 3. USA 55.6 8.4
4. Russia 22.2 5.3 4. Iraq 7.8 3.2 4. Russia 24.7 3.7
5. S-Korea 12.6 3.0 5. China 6.4 2.6 5. India 16.6 2.5
Source: Eurostat
 The most important trading partner of the Med 11 countries is the European 
Union: 41.6% of imports come from the EU 28, and 48.6% of exports are directed to 
the EU 28 member states. Considering the entire volume of trade, the EU is by far the 
most important trading partner of the region (44.2%), way ahead of China (9.2%) and 
the United States (8.4%). However, there are major differences within the region: while 
the EU contributes 60-80% to trade in Morocco and Tunisia, Egypt realises only 40%, 
and Jordan less than 20% of its trade with the EU.
 It seems evident that trading with the European Union is vital for the 
Mediterranean states, primarily the North African countries. It is also beyond doubt 
that these countries would be unable to develop without strengthening their relations 
with the EU. Whether the EU also has a true economic interest in the Southern 
Mediterranean economic development is less evident. On one hand, as we have seen, 
the Southern Mediterranean region makes only a minor contribution to the EU’s 
external trade; on the other hand, based on the current rate of economic growth, the 
region does not seem to offer particularly inviting prospects. The European Union is 
already the primary trading partner of the Mediterranean and mainly the Maghreb 
11 Based on 2015 data.
82
Tamás Szigetvári
countries. The EU could only increase its already high export to the region if these 
countries achieved economic growth.
 Impacts of the Euro-Mediterranean free trade agreements
 In what follows we give an overview of the effects of the FTAs concluded in 
the framework of Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements on the Southern 
Mediterranean economies, exploring whether they have contributed to economic 
growth; and if not, why the extent of positive developments fell short of expectations.
 One of the limitations is that free trade only concerns industrial goods, while 
agriculture – a sector crucial for the Southern Mediterranean countries – has been 
left out of the agreements. Admittedly, it was not only the EU that wanted to promote 
the interests of its southern member states (i.e. making sure that it is the agricultural 
products of the member states that have access to the internal market whilst external 
countries only play an ancillary role), the Southern Mediterranean countries also shied 
away from liberalising their heavily subsidised agricultural markets (López et al 2013: 
17). Although the EU signed agreements with most countries to facilitate the access of 
certain agricultural products to the internal market, the impact of these agreements 
were limited (and their scope could be easily modified). 
 In addition, the EU market had already been open for the industrial products 
of most Southern Mediterranean countries as earlier bilateral agreements had ensured 
unilateral access to markets for many products (in accordance with the GATT GSP). 
It is true that the so-called sensitive industries, for instance textile and apparel, were 
subject to special regulations. Mediterranean textile manufacturers could export to the 
EU up to the quotas granted earlier, but the system was gradually phased out because 
of the new regulations adopted at the GATT Uruguay Round (Kheir-El-Din – Abdel-
Fattah 2000). The quota-based previous Multifibre Agreement (MFA) was beneficial 
for small textile producers such as Tunisia and Egypt, providing them specific quotas, 
which meant these countries were not pushed out of the market by more competitive 
textile exporters (China, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh). 
 As it can be seen, the Euro-Mediterranean agreements have not bought a 
major positive change for the southern states. FTAs generated no breakthrough in the 
main export areas where the Southern Mediterranean countries would be competitive; 
in fact, changes in the multilateral regulation actually made their opportunities worse 
(De Ville – Reynaert 2010: 5). Also, protected earlier by high safeguard duties, the 
domestic industry of the southern countries must face stronger European competition. 
In order to give a chance for domestic economic actors to become stronger and prepare 
for keener competition, under the Euro-Mediterranean agreements protective duties 
were dismantled very gradually in the most affected industries, mainly those producing 
consumer goods (as slowly as over 15 years). The intended goal was for Mediterranean 
producers to achieve greater efficiency through rationalisation and modernisation 
so that as a result they would be able to compete with European products. However, 
despite their favourable geographic location, the Southern Mediterranean businesses 
have not managed to become integrated into the global value chains of multinational 
companies, and are hardly successful on their own. Still, there are a few positive 
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examples in Tunisia, Morocco or even Egypt, but they are exceptions rather than the 
general rule (Del Prete et al. 2016: 265). 
 The above factor shows that free trade and closer economic integration with 
the EU has not really made the Southern Mediterranean region more attractive to 
foreign direct investment. The impact that propelled the Central and East European 
countries towards modernisation built upon FDI from the 1990s until the early 2000s 
never materialised in the Southern Mediterranean region.
 The influx of capital was hindered, inter alia, by the bilateral nature of the 
agreements – in other words, the comprehensive Southern Mediterranean free trade 
area has not really been created. Missing agreements between the southern countries 
hampered real free trade, and the result of the so-called hub-and-spoke effect is that 
the EU remains a much more attractive investment target than the partner countries 
(Ülgen 2011: 19). After the 2004 Agadir Agreement Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan 
started to remove barriers in bilateral trade and made progress towards free trade, but 
the process is slow, and the complicated rules of origin used under the Agreement 
exacerbates it. Intraregional trade has been rather low to date, contributing a mere 
2.2% to the total trade of the region and there is even less trade between Maghreb and 
Mashreq countries. Current relations are primarily at subregional levels.
 Besides (or rather instead of) private capital the EU tried to promote the 
economic development of its Southern Mediterranean partners through development 
aids. Between 1979 and 2013 a total of 16 billion euros were deployed in development 
aids to the region, in the context of various institutional financial schemes as well as 
bilateral support mechanisms (Ayadi and Gadi 2013). After 1995, the rate of funds 
allocated to the region has decidedly risen showing the EU’s increasing interest; 
however, there are conspicuous differences between the countries in this respect, too. 
The differing priorities of the EU member states were also clear. Southern member 
states (Spain, Italy, and partly France, Greece and Portugal) basically pushed for a 
‘protectionism + more support’ type solution as an influx of competitive Southern 
Mediterranean agricultural produce and products was contrary to their interests, and 
their exports to these countries were not high; at the same time, themselves being 
beneficiaries, the EU’s support to (infrastructure and environmental) investments was 
important for them. Northern member states have traditionally supported free trade 
because of their industrial (and agricultural) exports, but they are less interested in 
pouring in massive financial support. Thus, interests within the EU are contradictory 
in respect of the two main areas (open trade and size of support) (Kourtelis 2015).
 Among the Mediterranean countries Tunisia’s economy was best prepared for 
the FTA. Yet even in Tunisia the impact was not entirely positive, as manifested in the 
demonstrations at the end of 2010 that triggered the Arab Spring. The lack of success 
can partly be imputed to defects in the Tunisian economic policy, although admittedly 
the international organisations and the EU endorsed the enforcement of strict fiscal 
and exchange rate policy instead of strengthening competitiveness and the potential 
for economic growth. Other reasons include poor tax collection on income from 
both capital and wages, neglecting public procurement project that would facilitate 
external and domestic capital investment, ignoring the need to develop a transparent 
competition policy, and excessively complicated administration of foreign trade 
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transactions (Chemingui - Bchir 2012: 113). 
 The lack of success of the European model of economic cooperation built on 
free trade in the Southern Mediterranean countries also has other reasons. They include 
the political instability of the Mediterranean region, the EU’s weaker commitment due 
to the internal crises, absence of the liberalisation of services, and non-harmonisation 
of regulations (Borrell-Porta 2012: 15). These factors gave rise to the idea that renewing 
and deepening the agreements could enhance the positive impacts of free trade.
 DCFTA and the Southern Mediterranean countries
 The events of the Arab Spring strengthened the European Commission’s resolve 
to revamp the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). One of the possible solutions 
for intensifying economic relations was the DCFTAs – deeper and more comprehensive 
free trade agreements than the existing ones. DCFTAs go far beyond the standard 
free trading in industrial goods; they cover agriculture as well as services, and involve 
extensive regulatory approximation, meaning the partner countries are expected to 
align their practices and norms with the relevant elements of the EU’s common market 
regulations (provisions relating to competition and trade, standards, etc.). As a result, 
the partner countries’ integration into the European Economic Area is expected to be 
much closer than under the earlier FTAs. In 2014 the EU concluded DCFTAs with 
three countries of the Eastern Partnership: Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. 
 As mentioned above, due to the limited information available on the already 
concluded agreements it is difficult to assess the DCFTAs’ effectiveness as yet. Different 
conditions and environments would in any case make comparability difficult. DCFTAs 
can certainly be forward-looking in that they prescribe a much stronger requirement 
of modernisation to the partner countries, and regulatory harmonisation would 
strengthen the partners’ attraction of capital, and would enable them to be integrated into 
international production networks. On the other hand, it is questionable whether there 
is a legitimate need for unilateral approximation which involves partial relinquishing 
of sovereignty. The EU concludes new type agreements with non-neighbour countries 
(e.g. Canada), and they cover services without, however, the requirement of alignment 
with the acquis (Hoekman 2016: 13). Furthermore, the DCFTAs greatly increase 
differentiation. While this has recently become a definite endeavour of the ENP, its 
effects are dubious. Will the other countries perceive differentiation as a pull factor? 
Also, while the Eastern Partnership countries, being European, have the hope of full 
EU membership at the end of the difficult and costly obligation of harmonisation 
necessitated by the DCFTA, this will not be the case with the Southern Mediterranean 
countries.
 This fact notwithstanding, in December 2011 the Council offered to open 
DCFTA negotiations with the four best prepared Southern Mediterranean countries 
that had made the biggest progress in strengthening trade relations: Morocco, Tunisia, 
Egypt and Jordan. The offer can, to a large extent, be seen as a reaction to the ‘shock’ of 
the Arab Spring (van der Loo 2015: 1): while Tunisia and Egypt were directly concerned 
by the political changes rocking the region, the ‘revolution’ spared Morocco and Jordan, 
two constitutional monarchies with more stable political legitimacy. 
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 The preliminary sustainability impact assessments (SIA) prepared for the 
European commission in 2013 and 2014 (Ecorys 2013a, Ecorys 2013b, Ecorys 2014a, 
Ecorys 2014b) analysed in detail the expectable economic, social, and environmental 
impacts of a DCFTA in the countries concerned. For example, the scenario developed 
for the DCFTA assumes that tariffs reduction on agricultural products between the 
EU and Tunisia will be 95% for Tunisian products entering the EU market and 80% 
for EU products entering the Tunisian market. As regards non-tariff measures, the 
potential impacts are assessed on a sectoral basis, and spill-over effects are also taken 
into account. The SIA concluded that a DCFTA could be successfully implemented 
with each of the four countries while also mentioned existing risks. 
 Comparing the four countries, it appears that Tunisia can realise the greatest 
economic benefit, with a long-term GDP growth of over 7%. Interestingly, the expected 
economic benefit of Morocco, the other economy with close ties to the EU, is far below 
the envisioned Tunisian figure. The SIAs also conducted sector-specific analyses 
and highlighted which sectors would benefit and which would lose out as a result of 
the DCFTA. Although the impacts are different in the individual countries, it food 
industry generally appears to be a loser. Conversely, the vegetables and the fruits sector 
as well as vegetable oils would be high-flying winners of the DCFTA in both Tunisia 
and Morocco. The textile and leather industries would generally fare poorly, but the 
Agreement would have highly positive impacts on machine industry and some other 
manufacturing and processing industries. 
 As regards the social pillar, the impacts are expected to be multifarious. In 
general, the beneficial effect on the GDP and national income would entail wage 
increases. In Egypt the SIA prognosticates increase for only the higher and medium 
income groups, and the effect of the DCFTA on the lower income population would be 
rather negative.
 The EU offered the DCFTA to all four countries. Understandably, only Morocco 
and Tunisia showed interest as the economy and trade of these two countries have far 
closer ties with the EU, and for them, the prospect of greater integration and the single 
market are attractive propositions. 
 The DCFTA negotiations with Morocco were launched in 2013 but came to 
a halt after a few rounds due to trade-related political disagreements12 which led to a 
serious deterioration of bilateral relations (van der Loo 2018). By 2019 the situation 
was resolved and currently the EU is working on the relaunch of negotiations. The 
DCFTA negotiations started with Tunisia in 2016, but there is a strong opposition on 
both sides. The EU’s southern agricultural producers are against the free import of 
competitive Tunisian products, and Tunisia has serious concerns about the negative 
economic and social impacts of the agreement (Rudolf – Werenfels 2018).
 The costs of regulatory approximation required by the DCFTAs are extremely 
high and could only be offset by surplus income of an economy that has become 
competitive and is able to fully exploit the benefit of access to the single European 
12 In its judgment entered in December 2015 the European Court of Justice ruled that bilateral trade agreements do 
not apply to goods imported from Western Sahara, a territory occupied by Morocco. In other words, the ECJ does not 
recognise Western Sahara as part of Morocco.
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market. Based on past experience, the dynamic driver effect of free trade is highly 
questionable in regard of the Southern Mediterranean countries. This casts doubts as 
to whether the new model of deepening free trade is the best way to further develop 
relations between the EU and the Southern Mediterranean countries.
 Conclusions
 Changes in the global economic environment and international trade 
policies have boosted the popularity of bilateral trade agreements and enhanced their 
importance. As multilateral consultations in the framework of the WTO are flagging, 
the European Union concluded dozens of free trade agreements over the past decade. 
The growing protectionism of the United States has also reinforced this trend, and in 
addition to the agreements already in force (with South Korea, Canada and Japan) the 
EU has been negotiating free trade agreements (FTAs) with a number of countries 
and integrations (Australia, New Zealand and Mercosur), or contemplating it with 
other countries (India). Besides covering trading in goods, these agreements regulate 
and partly harmonise other trade-related areas. However, agreements concluded 
with neighbouring regions go even further. By imposing strong unilateral regulatory 
approximation, the DCFTA model strives to involve the countries concerned in the 
single market without actual accession, and to help them create competitive growth 
economies by transforming their legal systems along European patterns. 
 The European model of economic cooperation relying on free trade, applied 
by the EU vis-à-vis the Southern Mediterranean countries since the 1990s, did not 
prove to be a unanimous success. Although there are several other factors in the 
background, this is rooted in the limited nature of the Euro-Mediterranean agreements, 
the absence of liberalisation of trading in agricultural goods and in services, and the 
region’s excessively bureaucratic environment hampering trade. Consequently, the EU 
now contemplates deepening free trade as the way to forwarding relations with other 
countries. Although in an optimal case DCFTAs can indeed facilitate the integration 
of the Southern Mediterranean countries into the global economy, for the time being 
risks seem to outweigh benefits. In the short term, the agreements involve massive costs 
which the EU could only partially shoulder. In the absence of ultimate EU accession 
the unilateral approximation of laws and regulations would lead to disproportionate 
burdens and unnecessary costs for the Southern Mediterranean countries. 
 Considering all these factors, there is a real danger that pushing through the 
DCFTAs with the Southern Mediterranean countries would result in counterproductive 
outcomes, deteriorating rather than enhancing the situation of the countries concerned. 
In an increasingly security conscious European Union, this may adversely affect 
security.
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